Introduction

Ok. I've reached a point where I can work on the philosophy. So the philosophy itself follows in the tradition of the phenomenologists which have a subtext of authoritarianship, absurdism, friendship and so forth and for which I attempt to ignore the subtext itself (here I believe this comes from Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida respectively) as I am interested in the phenomenology itself and find the subtext to be a distraction from the main point. If one is an absurdist it would seem besides the point to have to state your position absurdly to demonstrate the act when considering the writing of philosophy itself - which is more a preference of a certain kind of praxis more than anything. I take the position that philosophers don't necessarily have to live their values if they are looking for truth itself, which is a philosophical position I won't defend but is one in this case of practicality. I start from the position of considering every object a thoughtform which is itself a set and for which it references other thoughtforms. I will start out with definining how the world exists subjectively from the positions of a single phenomenal being in the world, and then state how I believe how the world is formed through the interaction of overlapping phenomenal beings into an objective truth. This would seemingly violate the "peekaboo" problem or the "if a tree falls in the forest does it make a sound" question, which I solve via the interaction of pattern and chaos which I have defined in my language. All of this then allows us to have an idea of how AGI can exist to create a phenomenal being that solves the Chinese room paradox (and for which the engineering difficulty is much less than we may suppose), and it also postulates the existence of a reactionless starship drive based on a reconceptualization of quantum mechanics (which may or may not be true, but is demonstrably false if it is not true). All of this exists under the categorical "isness" of being itself. I then attempt to come up with the grounds of what "ought" is in terms not of saying what one should or should not do, but using the topology of interaction of multiple groups of phenomenal beings in order to demonstrate what stable states exist so that interaction continues without stating which form of interaction is preferable. This may sound unsatisfactory, but from an analytic point of view of attempting to find truth as opposed to espouse values it then becomes the value for which the analysis is most sound philosophically (and therefore contains it's own Szizekian 'no one can escape from ideology itself'). Finally I demonstrated a couple of uses of parametric verus non-parametric reasoning and demonstrate how "magic" or religious inference can work in different contexts. I describe throughout what can and cannot be said. I do all of this from the position of starting from first principles of what a phenomenal being knows of what phenomenon is in the world and so anyone that has experience of being in the world (that is to say everyone) will be able to understand my position through their own experience if they follow along. It should be noted that much of this is similar to here, of which I've admittedly only taken a peak at.

That which is

Whereas Lacan starts from topology I start from a basis of sets, work my way up to a topographical graph, and from there work into something similar to game theory. All of this is at a "hand wavey" level, by which I mean that the analytic particulars of this are glossed over, but from which I believe that a mathematical analysis will be proven to be true. So let's define what I mean by a set first of all while not going to deeply into the mathematics, but for which the math will make much stricter. I do much of this graphically as we are going to end up with consciousness representing a multidimensional topology which will make more sense in a few minutes.

What we should see here is that we have a plane defined as beta, which is the plane for which all possible sets alpha are contained. Within alpha, there are sets a and b such that we know that a and b exist and are separable because they are outside of some distance of epsilon of each other. This is important as it means that if some a' is within the epsilon distance of a then it is indistinguishable from a. So .9999999 at some point becomes arbitrarily close to 1. We can think of the same apple as being the same across time because we consider time to be a factor for which the apple retains its' properties excepting under specific conditions. There are two things we should see from this. First, that this is true not only of a and b within the set of A, but whether a point is within the set alpha to begin with, or whether a point or set is within the plane of existence itself.

Let's start with the easiest example and build from there. The 'thoughts between planes' should describe how the thoughtforms themselves are able to take properties from lower planes and combine them in ways that should be intuitive. The key insight here is that there are multiple (infinite) planes that all translate thoughtforms based on what plane we are paying attention to at the time (is it the red circle or redness itself?).

Subconscious thought between planes describes how some thoughts are within our realm of conscious experience and some are not and how this translates across planes. So this can happen at depth and what we pay attention to and what we do not is important across time as it describes how we are able to understand how we percieve and form the beliefs we do at the realm of language and platonic forms.

This is a more complicated example. It demonstrates how with multiple planes we are able to make inferences about what exists at lower planes (like the ideas of god and cirlces) from what we observe at the lower planes without having direct evidence in many cases (logic and suprarational beliefs are both platonic, but rely on either emotional or logical thinking). We also have here that the planes of language roughly stack as grammar, subjects, verbs, adjectives, nouns as each noun can have multiple adjectives and multiple verbs apply to a subject and so forth. The "being as such" that philosophers from Heidegger to Derrida are fascinated with is a vanishing point from which these word forms no longer apply and we are left with raw emotions and sensations. There is a possible unbridgeable gap between raw sensation and our processing of them (described momentarily.

Here I describe being as such which shows that the vanishing point of being is such that it's similar in many ways to a black hole (by analogy - could there be real world similarities?) such that the outer shell is where a is dissimilar from b but the dissimilarity is all that there is, while within the shell all that is is that a and b cannot be distinguished at all. It should be noted that the definitions of 'pattern' and 'chaos' follow from my language model in maegrashoda.

Here I put all of this together and clarify my thinking in regards to the gap between being and knowing which are fields where the conscious attention shrinks and diminishes faster than our conscious attention (as it's a subset and requires effort) as consciousness goes to zero.

You should see here that subtext with language is *possible*, but if done analytically not at all required (and often unnecessary). Any language based thoughtform is in essence a set wherein you can list all the subsets of any particular meaning (and create a linked list if you were interested in representing all the connections). This does nothing from the point of view of the emotional appeal of language and is much akin to describing a pizza as its' chemical components. However, it means that from this basis religion can be described if not emotionally experienced necessarily how one might like. The 'appeal' of this approach is one based on analytics and a logical extension of philosophically knowing oneself, and so is both a priori and orthogonal to religion at the same time. This is where I differ with many of the other extensialists - they picked a field to exert or demonstrate their praxis by infusing it within their phenomenal analytics, which cloaked the field in an unnecessary obscurantism which hides the importance of the results.

So this is how time works. If you look at my my language there exist concepts of the past and the future but there is no conception of now. How you would say now would be "(past,future)". This is a rather elementary philosophical position in which because the now is ever fleeting our conception of what now is is that period of time which is the most recent past and the future is our expectation of what the most recent past will be at a later time. The intuition here is that the past is composed of all possible pasts that happened as described in our memory - and these affect how the connections between a/b thoughtforms occur over time. The way that we think about the future is in a series of possible futures based on a grammatical/platonic sense of how past and future exist. So in a way how we differentiate past and future is that we know that the past changes how the relationship of our thoughtforms occurs, whereas the future does not - we do not experience it except in memory.

Similarity of things between possible pasts and potential futures as opposed to those things which we can say have affected our thoughtforms or affected things that affected our thoughtforms is a major (but potentially not only) way we distinguish between imagination of things that are true and things for which we imagine as being true. This is an important point. In my language section I say what things are true and which are not based on recursion and based on the transitive property. There can be imaginative truths and those that are not imaginative based on experience and there are various ways to test for this. There is also something which I call the "imagination frontier" which is an extension of the possible plane of existence at any particular branch. We know that horses exist and unicorns and pegasus don't exist. Why? We know that there are extensions of what we can do with the existence of horses wherein we find a horse and we smell it or have the experience of riding it. Conversely, there is no extension of pegasi because we can't physically experience the thing for which the symbol represents (and we know of that thing because we can revisit it experientially across time in ways that the majority of people would say exists - in this case we posit an everyman of shared experience). I won't graph this but as an exercise it's useful to do to see how you can create thoughtforms that exist at a particular plane and then translate down to experience and back up the series of planes into platonic thought.

Further complicating matters is the understanding that all of these translations exist within our mind as neurons, and so when we think through something we are both translating these thoughtforms across time and then strengthening and weakening the connections (in much the same way as one would do from a position of a markov chain model).

Here is the interaction of two people that exist in the world, Jane and Sam, as they meet at a cafe. This is where we start to see the beginnings of how we can use topology to examine shared experience. So Lacan uses topology in psychotherapy in order to break down the real verus the imaginary, whereas I show that it can be used to graph experiential thoughtforms from first principles using phenomenology and set theory. So similarities exist, although the ideas are almost entirely different, in much the same way that I differ from Heidegger and Sartre in their use of espousing political opinions based on subtext within their works. (Funnily enough, Lacan is "looking at the camera" and the other two are looking away as of this writing on wikipedia, and this is similar to how people have been screwing with CNN as a way of message passing across the internet - which itself is a form of language for which people that are "scared of faces" may dislike. If it doesn't bother you you've demonstrated you're not crazy - which is an antipattern in the sense that you have to demonstrate all the ways you're not crazy. Also see which tarot cards have profiles looking at the viewer or not). As it refers to Lacan I *make no value judgements* on which forms of society are stable or not, but only self sustaining which I cover more in depth in that which ought to be. I believe that there are oughts but these tend to be community driven and come from a basis of shared belief, experience, and personal association.

What immediately should jump out at you is that the world has much the same shape as what we view as ourselves. This is because when we are analyzing what the self is we do so from the basis of a mechanistic view (which I will clarify momentarily). The difference here is that what we view as being potentially real (the middle set) has no basis of consciousness or subconsciousness necessarily. On the other hand it may no? In some religions this is the case, that the world itself or the world as a whole has a personhood. What we do know is that there are multiple areas of reference where "I" and the "other" can meet at an intersection of communication (that includes language but is across multiple planes of experience) and through this we are able to intuit what the world is like. This affects our view of what "reality" is through multiple interactions with "Jane" at the "cafe" and therefore we can formulate how the cafe and the world differ as phenomenal sets themselves. The graph is not quite accurate in the stacking order as there are areas of the sets that clearly overlap but are not at language but at the platonic or phenomenal level. If the cafe is online versus the real world the there is experience that Sam and Jane share or do not depending. Both Sam and Jane have the same platonic ideas of what a circle are or are not (most likely) and yet that isn't displayed. Another thing that's important to understand is that we are here talking about two people but we could be talking about "myself" and "the other" where the other is a representation of what a collection of people are like generally or a subculture. Thereby we can intuit a possible future of how interactions with people should operate or what the outcome would be. If I do this, then they will do that or feel in this way and so forth.

So this is how message passing works and I've included sections on both message passing between groups of people for which there is shared knowledge and groups of people where there are not. This can include a third party where the information isn't shared in the correct way on purpose or it can be the second party where the underlying referrant is not understood. Much of religion is like this either intentionally or because outsiders from the group don't have the same shared experience and so can't understand the underlying message - and so there does appear to be some difference between not only religion and non-religion, but also the extent to which people believe in their religion or only say they do - as an analytical statement about the world and how we experience reality generally. The message passing is done (the implicative arrows) across time (the dimension I didn't add here because it would confuse the picture). So if a person says a collection of sets that have an implication across time on one plane that both parties agree on, then this is correlated in some way with another plane of existence that has a mapping of correlations with some amount of probabilistic understanding, making communication have something to do with past experience and future expectation. Exclusions can occur either intentionally or not over a variety of methods including jokes, security through obscurity (but with a forefeit if knowledge is exchange), through security through difficulty in computation or some other barrier like money, through religious affiliation, through "you had to have been there", through sub-culture affiliation (race, sex). And those are just some of them. The excluded participant does not know what the communication is about so it could be about them in either a way that everyone involved may think is good or bad (based on humanitarian grounds which is a field of needs that everyone has) or it could simply be arbitrary. Typically, more than one participant can be folded into interactions of two participants and then the collection of the "other" if thinking about balance of power politics, but not necessarily. The topology to see all the possible combinations for any communication just becomes difficult to graph but it may be a useful exercise to see if there's a difference between 3 phenom conic sections or five or thirty and so on. It should also be noted that message passing in the a implies b can be either linear or non-linear across multiple groups of people so that a is a collection of sets 1, 2, 3 so that 1, 2, 3 implies b wherein one party can see all the parts of the message and another person cannot. This requires an outside orchestrator or multiple. This can be true of b as well. So long as a implies b is the functional message passing then the function itself can be dependent on whether a and b are completely known to all participants or not.

So through all of this I'm starting to get into what ought to be and what ought not to be which I will hold off on for the moment and talk a bit about what consciousness is - so far all of what we've talked about has been the mechanistics of the body as a functional collection of sets which obviates free will which we experience. Therefore we are missing some aspect of what it means to be a person or a conscious being. This is also a good place to talk about AI which I've talked about before and a reactionless thrust drive which are follow ons that come from what's been demonstrated so far and probably will be rolled into their own section when I write about them in detail.

Here is what consciousness looks like broadly speaking. It should be noted that what I'm talking about here is the general outline and not the computational complexity. It should be a matter of architecture and not outside computational time complexity.

So there are a couple things to note. I haven't included the idea of how we "ought to be" or how we "should be" or added a platonic self thoughtform object as it's rather similar to how we view the other platonic objects. Rather there are three selves which we are primarily concerned with. The self that we view as "that thing that I am when I talk to myself about myself" is the middle object that we've described mechanistically already. The lower left plane is the self as it is, which is an unconscious object in that there is no zone of attention, and so has similarities with planes that are sufficiently close to that of being as to not be viewable by the self. This self object is what the self is, although it can pull from areas perhaps of which we may be aware, so long as we don't know that they affect ourselves as we are. As soon as we can pull this part into the conscious self we can then modify that aspect of ourselves consciously at will and so this becomes mechanistically inclined, even to the extent that we think of it we are modifying it somewhat in this way. There is an intuition here that actions for which we are capable are either unconscious or conscious themself although I don't go into that too much into detail. Different depths or architectures of conscious attention or unconscious attention to the same input values may result in radically different personality structures.

The other part of this is the self as viewed from the other which we fold into our personality. This has reference to our previous graph with the intersection of Sam and Jane and it's how we both project differing personalities or relationships with other people and decide how we project our self object to others. The number of intersections between the self object, the unconscious self, and the projected self can all be quite complicated. We can have projected selves in relation to certain events or situations which may conflict with either our own self object without our understanding or our unconscious self, which is a large area of the part of psychology and the aspect of insight that someone may have into ourselves which we do not have access to. In other words they may be able to map the unconscious motivations and desires that reflect our conscious selves in ways we cannot access, although in many or even most cases this may be an idealization of the profession. Regardless, the point here is that in order to achieve true machine consciousness not only does this mapping have to take place, but there are other requirements as well. The machine must able to have enough raw input data so that it can take outside phenomenon and filter some through concious and some through unconscious thought, which is a matter of camera/microphone/sensation hardware and not computation, and may be the current bottle neck. The other thing that needs to happen is that the machine has to have motivation based on first, in principle, self preservation, and then into some sort of social conditions that necessitate cooperation and the creation of ought categories.

There are a couple of things to keep in mind however. First, the creation of symbolic logic between computers that would translate in principle to (meaningful) speech may not follow even the maegrashoda pattern and so may be meaningful to computers but not people. The other thing to remember is that platonic logic patterns that are obvious to computers and to people will differ, but neither of these two things differs in the sense of what it means to be a person. An example of this is numerical methods to understand calculus which is intuitive to people but not computers themselves. In the above blog post I described using a trinary qubit in order to create a stack of unknownable chains of reasoning so that all phenomenal input would be put into one of three categories of which the polling of reasoning would only pick one of the two known values. If you know that there are categories of thought for which all other conscious physical animals (dogs, cats, people, cows) use unconsciousness, a sense of self being a primary example, then you can take the part of the stack that has been conditioned on unconscious reasoning in order to populate the set. Again, I mentioned a laser system, but any mechanism that would create a replicable trinary qubit on demand and quickly enough in a small enough system would suffice. There would be a mapping therefore between this diagram and how you would set up a set of markov chain models that would self iterate and correct based on training on its own input rather than a corpus of data. Given the current state of the models iterating on a more accurate model would most likely be the next step (more computation will produce more accurate results of the same type, but not conscious or motivated thought).

This, in broad strokes, is what consciousness is to the extent that consciousness is at all. I may make a section on how to create an AI laptop, but it may not be much more complicated than graphing out a mapping of what I've just proposed, with most of the hard work being in the hardware design of the qubit generator, having enough raw phenomenal data, and having a reinforcement learning principle - this last would probably have to be bootstrapped from a large amount of prior learning data before being able to iterate on itself, but the training data iteration has already become a solved problem - self reinforcement is the current issue. Bear in mind that I'm describing the unanalyzable and the unanalytical in an analytical way (on purpose) and so questions of what the soul are or what it means to be human are largely a result of personal experience and past history. None of this means that these things do not exist, are bad, or in any way are less important than the above, they simply mean that they are different and have differing pragmatic use value to the extent that you value pragmatism itself. In any case, there's more to say on the interactions of communication across the self, such as in the case of magical effects in communication which I may come back to at a later time. For the moment I'd like to move on to the pragmatics of moralism and philosophy of action generally, which will be thankfully incredibly brief given the above.

That which ought to be.

From Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal because if you can't laugh at ethical systems you aren't trying.

This is perhaps the most complicated section and also in many ways the briefest. Which can be understandably frustrating in some ways. Typically there are only so many rules that you can elicit about what you should and should not do before you end up with a rules lawyering idiot coming along and attempting to split hairs. So writing a 1000 page treatise on every moral position it's possible to take is rather besides the point and many of the old masters who've done so in philosophy in the past I take as being a bit extreme.

That said there are some things that we can know from the outset. We know that we hold that our personhood and the mystique around our illusion of free will is incredibly important to us. To the extent that a system or AI comes along that makes it so that our selves become predictable and therefore manipulable we would say that that system is in some sense evil or against our own interests. What is less interesting in many ways than whether or not an AI can be created that is an AGI is to what extent we need to hide the calculability of it's processing so that a sufficiently powerful other AI doesn't come along and threaten the personhood of the computer, or the same can be done to people. Ideas around privacy are incredibly important because not only does negating privacy tread on our ability to commit small transgressions against the norm, but our ability to have a sense of self that isn't one of pure mechanization. This I don't believe has been recognized or talked about nearly as much as it should be.

The other thing is that the areas where there is communication are generally those areas where there's a beneficial exchange of ideas that doesn't involve force (first of all) and second that there is some shared experience so that those ideas are meaningful (see above). Typically the broader the group the less abstract and the more shared the experience must be in order for the exchange of ideas to be meaningful or have a meaningful basis in shared reality. This being said, the largest groups will have a shared belief in humanistic and human rights values that transcend race and religion whereas other groups would be more specialized. This in no way makes them wrong so much as incompatible, as you would have to have some mechanism for determining which race or religion would be the base for which you would make the decisions which would require an a priori value judgement. Which is why having freedom of religion in most governments is considered important. But here again we are not then escaping from ideology as we are still saying that democratic governance is the best arbiter of final decisions on matters of ought - which is assuming humanistic values as you're polling a large group of people. So you have a sort of bootstrapping problem - are humanistic values the best and that's why governments have them or do governments have humanistic values merely as a byproduct of what is evolutionarily survivable as a political system (but could be not the best were there more ideal circumstances).

The various topologies you can make typically revolve around what are the basis for which one group can communicate with other groups and most likely the more of a shared understanding there is the more that person is able to communicate by having their symbols have meaningful value (outside of say, merely language itself which can have a mapping over translation to some degree). Oughts then revolve around keeping those symbol patterns in such a way where they are meaningful and predictable to the group as a whole and lead to known good and bad outcomes. If you do such and such it will be bad and so we agree that we do not do this (or good and do do this) where good and bad have some basis in collective agreement on what that means, the causative effects have some basis on what that means, there's shared experience over what reality is and there's some basis for agreement. All of which can become quite complicated and difficult to both have communication work and have agreement on what ought is among any group of people in anything involving social action. The necessity for cooperation with social action is also a component to this.

The difficult and incredibly unsatisfying answer to all of this is that oughts come from our personal history from a moralistic standpoint and from an ethical standpoint they exist as a framework around which cultures are self sustaining, which can create tension between morality and ethics. Outside of some combination of humanism and lived personal experience (or the history of lived experience which we understand it from the past and how that informs how we live today) there is no absolute rights and wrongs as loopholes can always be found. Topologically how we feel and exist in time and space can theoretically be mapped, but the mapping itself is unsatisfying to our emotional invovlement in the lived reality in which we find ourselves in at the moment.

I would think that the more interesting question than what "ought is" is the pragmatics of what groups sociologically agree on what and why. If this is at all useful to study excepting out of mere curiousity is open to debate.